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I.
Introduction
One of the intriguing problems in the study of a society is the rela tionship between wealth and power. It is often argued, for instance, that political power is in the hand of the wealthy, because only they can afford to acquire it. While this may be true, the present paper attempts to for malize the relationship in the other direction, namely that wealth follows political power. In order to carry out this formalization, the Shapley value [3] will be employed.
Consider the following paradigm case of a social game. There are two agents and one good. Each agent i has the same linear utility function, say Ui(Xi) = x^. Each agent has an endowment of one unit of the good; hence, wealth is distributed equally. However, one agent has all the political power; call this agent 1, the dictator. In particular, agent 1 has the power to levy taxes on agent'2 at rates up to 100%. If one applies Nash's bargain ing theory [8] to this situation, one finds that the optimal threat point is given by (u^, u^) = (1,0). At this point, the dictator threatens to tax agent 2 at a rate of 100%, while agent 2 threatens to destroy his endowment rather than pay the tax. In Nash's theory these threats are not carried out; rather, a compromise is reached at the point (u^, u^) = (1.5, .5). At the compromise outcome, the powerless agent 2 is paying a 50% tax. However, this compromise tax rate does increase as the powerless agent becomes more risk a v e r s e . This paper generalizes the above results to the case in which endowments are unequal, utility is not necessarily transferrable, the distribution of political power is allowed to vary between equality and dictatorship, and most important of all, the agents with the lesser political power can be subdivided at will (form a nonatomic measure space). In this framework, the Varying the parameter a reveals a large variety of collegial polities.
When a equals zero, for example, one has dictatorship. The collegium essen tially is winning by itself, since it requires measure zero support from the ocean. For a equals .5, the collegium requires half the ocean's support, as was the case in the Roman republic. For cy equals one, essentially the only winning coalition is T itself. In this case, legislation can only be passed by unanimous consent.
Political power in a collegial polity is measured by the Shapley value, as proposed in [10] . The Shapley value measures the probability that a player is pivotal to a coalition, in the sense that the coalition is winning if it includes the player, and not winning if it excludes him. Let cp (•) denote this probability. Xn [10] » it is shown that the distribution of poli tical power is directly related to a by the formula
The collegium is more powerful, the smaller the percentage of the ocean re quired to win, and all powerful, when it wins by itself.
The economic structure of the model is as follows. There is an initial distribution p of a single good, satisfying
The after-tax distribution x may differ from p, but in any event must satisfy represents the utility to T-S. Since the ultimate Nash bargain will allocate
it is clear that S seeks to maximize, T-S to minimize f-g. Now, suppose S is winning and T-S is losing. The optimal threat strategy for S is to tax T-S at 100% and allocate the proceeds effciently among its members. The optimal counter strategy''' for T-S is to destroy its The latter extension is made by supposing that given X> utility is trans ferable. Let cpv. represent the Shapley value given this supposition. A value allocation x is defined such that (7a) \(c)u^(x(c)^=cpvj^(ic|) (7b) X(t) u(^(t)y dt =cpv^(t) dt 0^t <: 1.
resources. Hence, f(cT,T) =^(S), g(CT,T) = 0 and W (S) = r (S) . By symmetry, if S losing, then W (T-S) == r. (T-S) and so W (S) = -r (T-S).
A value allocation x is realized solely by transfers of resources. If the X in (7) are such that the maxima in (4) and (5) are actually reached at x, then cpv is defined to be the Shapley value for the non-transferable utility X gone.
Interest thus centers on the asymptotic Shapley vsiLue of the non-transferable utility game (T,v ). In this regard, the basic result is the following: Proof. Using the results of [6, 7] , the asymptotic value of the atom c is The meaning of the value allocation will be clarified by considering some examples. Example 1. u^= x(t), u^= x(c). This is the transferable utility case, \(t) = X(c) = 1. Since r^(s,c) = p^+sp^,~sp^, (8a) implies in this (1- case that x(c) = p(c) +^p^The collegium retains its endowment and collects a tax from the ocean in proportion to its political power, reaching a maximum of 50% when i t is dictatorial. As expected, the collegium's value allocation increases as its political power increases. The value allocation of the collegium approaches its maxi mum of + p2 = 2 when it is dictatorial and a approaches 0, i.e., as the ocean approaches the extreme of risk aversion. Further, the collegium value allocation increases as the risk aversion of the members of the ocean increases Indeed, when the collegium is dictatorial, it is collecting the taxes paid by the ocean at the Aumann-Kurz marginal tax rate .
Again, as in example 2, one finds that the risk aversion of the collegium does not affect its value allocation. This is perhaps the greatest difference from the case where the ocean bargains as a single agent; for there, the value allocation depends on the risk postures of both sides.
